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INTERNATIONALIZING POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE: THE "HYBRID" SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE
Lisa Danish*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Cold War, the international community wit-
nessed formerly frozen civil rivalries degenerate into bloody and protracted
civil wars. Despite the development of the human rights corpus, which re-
jected the inviolability of state sovereignty, states were nevertheless wary to
undermine the principle of non-interference with sovereign affairs, a vestige
of the foundational Westphalian system. This reluctance to intervene was
also evident with respect to the new problem of "failed" states, particularly
after the debacle in 1993 of the United States' "Operation Restore Hope" in
Somalia.
After developed nations stood by while former Yugoslavs and
Rwandans slaughtered one another, by the late 1990s there developed a
resolve for new methods of post-conflict resolution.' The main institutions
that evolved in this vein were: (1) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
and (2) International Criminal Tribunals. This paper focuses on the newest
development in post-conflict justice: the role of hybrid international crimi-
nal courts. To this end, this paper takes as a case study the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, a hybrid court established in 2000. A review of the Spe-
* Ph.D. candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, Department of Polit-
ical Science; J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2004;
M.A., Central European University; B.A., Binghamton University, State University
of New York. The author is presently a staff attorney with the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, Office of Staff Counsel, in Richmond, Virginia. For
their contributions to the author's thinking and helpful reviews of her earlier drafts
of this paper, she wishes to thank Makau Mutua, Claude E. Welch, Jr., and David
A. Westbrook. As a former Gilbert Moore Fellow and International Law Fellow at
the State University of New York at Buffalo, she also thanks the Baldy Center for
Law & Social Policy and its director, Lynn Mather, and the Buffalo Human Rights
Center, for their support of her research.
1 See generally STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCrEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY (2d ed. 2001); PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS (2001);
MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AF-
TER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1999); RuTi G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUS-
TICE (2001).
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cial Court is then used to explore and assess the utility of hybrid courts in
post-conflict situations.
Accordingly, this paper first reviews the history and context of the
Sierra Leonean civil war. The next section assesses the Special Court's
challenges with respect to post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone. The
paper concludes with observations about the relative advantage of a hybrid,
in-country international tribunal, as opposed to the permanent International
Criminal Court at The Hague.
THE SIERRA LEONEAN CIVIL WAR, NARRATED
Failed Post-Colonial Government Inspires Rebellion
The story of Sierra Leone's civil war begins with the failure of its
post-colonial government. 2 In 1961, Sierra Leone won its independence
from the United Kingdom and was ruled successively for six years by the
Margai brothers, Milton and Albert, of the Sierra Leone People's Party. In
the 1967 election, the All People's Congress (APC) ascended to power and
held it, first under Siaka Stevens (1968 - 1985) and then under General
Joseph Momoh (1985 - 1992), for nearly 30 years. The APC was a corrupt
government, and over time, the country's physical infrastructure decayed,
the public bureaucracy atrophied, and the majority of Sierra Leoneans lived
in poverty.3
However corrupt and abhorrent the Momoh government was, the
rebel movement that arose to challenge it was, by comparison, grotesque.
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) formed in 1984 and was composed
of "unemployed and unemployable youths ... prone to criminal behavior,
petty theft, drugs, drunkenness, and gross indiscipline."'4 The RUF also in-
cluded some Liberian fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic
2 Sierra Leone's colonial history and demographics: The British founded Sierra
Leone in 1789 as a colony for freed African slaves. Its people, therefore, are a mix
of the descendants of freed immigrants and anglicized Creoles who generally oc-
cupy the capital, and other groups who occupy the interior. Indigenous Sierra Le-
oneans are ethnically Temne (in the northern province) or Mende (in the southern
province). The country is religiously diverse, with people observing Islam, Christi-
anity, and traditional religions.
3 See generally JOE A.D. ALIE, A NEW HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE (1990).
4 Ibrahim Abdallah, Bush Paths to Destruction: Origin and Character of the
Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone, 36 J. MOD. AFRICAN STuD. 203, 207-08
(1998).
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Front of Liberia.5 Leading the RUF was a former army corporal and pho-
tographer, Foday Sankoh, who had been imprisoned in 1971 for plotting a
coup against the APC.6
In defiance of "all available typologies on guerilla movements," 7
the RUF's uniqueness was that it was composed of rebels without a cause.
The RUF was not organized enough to be characterized as a warlord insur-
gency, and its goals did not include regional autonomy, ethnic dominance,
or radical reform. 8 Because of its extreme brutality towards civilians, the
RUF "remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survivalist needs
of its predominantly uneducated and alienated battle front and battle group
commanders." 9 On March 23, 1991, the RUF, with a force of about 100
combatants, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia, beginning a civil war that
lasted at least eleven years. Within a few months, RUF forces controlled
one-fifth of the country in the South-East region, and gained strength by
forcibly impressing non-combatants into service. 10
To combat the RUF, General Momoh recruited citizens to a "volun-
teer brigade" of the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), doubling the SLA's size
to 6,000 personnel.11 Once General Momoh delayed elections, citing the
SLA's inability to defeat the RUF, a group of insulted and bedraggled SLA
troops marched to Freetown to collect their paychecks in person. General
Momoh, anticipating a coup, fled to Guinea, leaving the State House only
lightly defended. 12
With Momoh gone, and his defenders summarily executed on the
beach, a 27-year-old army captain, Valentine Strasser, declared himself to
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sierra Leone: "We'll Kill You If You Cry," Sexual
Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict 10 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2003/sierraleone.
6 Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone, in AFRICAN GUERRILLAS 176 (Christopher Clapham ed., 1998).
7 Id. at 191. Certainly there have been guerilla movements that bear similarities
to the RUF, however. See Rebels in History - Here is the Profile of Contemporary
African Rebels, AFRICA NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 191-92.
10 See ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA
LEONE AND GUINEA-BISSAU 83 (2002).
11 See GEG CAMPBELL, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the
World's Most Precious Stones (2002).
12 See IAN SMILLIE ET AL., THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE,
DIAMONDS, AND HUMAN SECURITY (2000), available at http://www.sierra-leone.
org/heartmatter.html. There are differing reports on this point.
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be head of state on April 30, 1992.13 Strasser formed the National Provi-
sional Ruling Council (NPRC), promising an elected civilian government
by 1995 and an immediate end to the rebel war. He also increased the army
to some 10,000 soldiers.
By October, 1992, the RUF was closing in on the diamond-rich
Kono mining district. 14 Called on to defend Kono, SLA soldiers became
distracted by diamonds; they began mining for themselves. 15 Many SLA
soldiers, at least 20 percent, 16 began fighting on both sides of the civil war,
giving rise to the term "sobel" - soldier by day, rebel by night. This blend-
ing of RUF and SLA had disastrous effects on the country's ability to quell
the fighting:
This unpopular insurgency turned into an intractable rebel
war once the appearance of RUF fighters provided the op-
portunity for other armed men to take advantage of oppor-
tunities to loot and settle local scores. These activities were
thus not a rebellion against an old order. Instead, they of-
fered to marginalized youth the prospect that they could re-
negotiate (or force a change in) their position vis-A-vis an
existing political network that controlled economic oppor-
tunity. [The loss of centralized patronage under the APC]
gave "armed marginals" more diverse points of access
through armed gangs and the army to violent commercial
networks, now in ways that posed greater threats of what
remained of public order.' 7
Despite this phenomenon, the SLA made significant military advances in
1992 and 1993, forcing the RUF into the Gola forest reserves.
During this regrouping, the RUF changed its tactics; instead of
capturing and defending permanent settlements, it opted, instead, to estab-
lish several bush camps. The RUF traded diamonds for arms in Liberia and
Guinea,18 and by late 1994 made advances toward Freetown in hit-and-run
style attacks. Strasser appealed to Nigeria for help, and in response, Nigeria
13 President of Sierra Leone Ousted; Troops Rule West African Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A10.
14 ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 84.
15 Id.
16 See SMILLIE, supra note 12, at 104 (NPRC's estimate).
17 William Reno, Sierra Leone: Warfare in a Post-State Society, in STATE FAIL-
URE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 71, 86 (Robert I. Rotberg, ed.,
2003).
18 See CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 73.
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sent several hundred troops to guard Freetown and the Gondama refugee
camp near the central city of Bo.
Unable to either make peace with or defeat the rebels with (and
within) the national army, the RUF continued its advance toward Freetown,
threatening the capital's suburbs in April 1995. As a last resort, in May
1995, Strasser paid a South African private security company, Executive
Outcomes, to retake the valuable diamond mining areas of the country, in
exchange for an estimated $1.8 million each month and diamond mining
concessions. 19 By all accounts, the hired guns achieved a measure of suc-
cess, at least wresting away mining territory from the RUF in mid-1995 and
early 1996 - but then that was the source of their income.20
Executive Outcomes also began working with the Civil Defense
Forces, pro-government militias that different local communities had
formed out of defensive necessity. Reports describing these units conflict -
Human Rights Watch describes them as "traditional hunters and young
fighters" whereas William Reno describes them as "unruly youth" - but
unquestionably the predominant group among these was a force of between
17,000 and 35,000 ethnic Mende fighters called the Kamajors.2 1
In January 1996, Strasser, who decided not to run for President af-
ter all, was overthrown in a palace coup by his deputy, Brigadier Julius
Maada Bio.2 2 To ease the transition, the United States and Britain offered
Strasser and his entourage scholarships and stipends to study abroad at the
universities of their choice.2 3 Bio started peace negotiations with the RUF,
and under great domestic and international pressure, pledged a return to
civilian rule.24 Sierra Leoneans held elections in February 1996 and voted
into power Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former employee of the United Nations
(UN) Development Programme. Kabbah's election slogan, which would
later prove most unfortunate, was "The Future Is in Your Hands."
Despite Executive Outcomes, Kabbah's government was constantly
under threat, and many Sierra Leoneans criticized him as indecisive. 25 Una-
19 See generally Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One's Own, HARPER'S MAG., Feb.
1997 at 44.
20 Id. at 48.
21 See INST. FOR INT'L STRATEGIC STUD., THE MILITARY BALANCE 1997-1998 257
(1997).
22 See ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 84-85.
23 See Steve Coil, The Other War: Part V, Buedu to Koidu: The Best Intentions,
WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 9, 2000 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/photo/galleries/sierraileone/Part_5.htm.
24 See ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 85.
25 There were at least three coup attempts in Kabbah's first ten months in office.
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ble to rely comfortably on the SLA, Kabbah turned to the Kamajors for
protection. The Kamajors, in turn, used their position to arbitrarily detain
people, extract bribes and beat up police officers. 26 Kabbah also received
assistance from Nigerian soldiers stationed in Freetown; after its troops
foiled a fourth coup attempt in September 1996, Nigeria sent in even more
troops. Therefore, in the successful months of Sierra Leone's fledgling de-
mocracy, the government was actively defended by its own army, an expen-
sive mercenary outfit, a contingent of Nigerian troops, and a civilian militia.
The Region Steps In, And Nigeria Steps Up
In November 1996, upon the invitation of Cote d'Ivoire's foreign
minister, Amara Essy, the RUF and Kabbah's government entered into
peace negotiations. On November 30, 1996, Kabbah and Sankoh signed the
Abidjan Peace Accord.27 The Accord gave a blanket amnesty to the RUF in
exchange for a ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization. It also called
for the deployment of neutral international observers and a capable security
force to enforce the peace process. In January 1997, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan proposed a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone with 720
troops, but the UN Security Council never adopted his recommendation. 28
The RUF did not abide by the Abidjan Accord's disarmament
schedule. In January 1997, however, under pressure from the International
Monetary Fund, Kabbah released Executive Outcomes from service.29 A
900-man strong contingent of Nigerian troops replaced the mercenaries,
many serving as Kabbah's personal bodyguards.30 The RUF's Sankoh,
meanwhile, left Abidjan without word to his Ivorian hosts, and got arrested
in Nigeria while arranging an arms deal. 31
On May 25, 1997, Kabbah was ousted in a coup led by Major
Johnny Paul Koromah, 33, a former army bodyguard to Strasser.32
Koromah instituted rule by military decree, established the Armed Forces
26 Reno, supra note 17, at 88.
27 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and
the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), U.N. SCOR, Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/1996/1034 (Nov. 30, 1996), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/
abidjanaccord.html.
28 Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democ-
racy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Le-
one, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 326 (1998).
29 ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 87.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 86.
32 See Coil, supra note 23.
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Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and invited the RUF to partner in the new
regime.33 RUF troops entered Freetown openly for the first time, looting
the city in a program called, "Operation Pay Yourself. '34 Kabbah, mean-
while, fled to exile in Conakry, Guinea, and asked Nigeria to restore him to
power. Nigerian troops defending Kabbah and the capital attempted to re-
verse the coup by force,35 but the AFRC and RUF forced them out of the
city.36 By June 4, 1997, Freetown was in ruins.37
Both regional and other international organizations refused to rec-
ognize Koromah's regime. The Nigerian head of state General Sani
Abacha, then chairman of the Economic Organization of West African
States (ECOWAS), convened several meetings of groups of ECOWAS
members to attempt to reverse the coup via diplomatic means.38 Although
ECOWAS levied economic sanctions against Sierra Leone in August 1997,
the group stopped short of authorizing the use of force against Koromah's
government. 39 Nevertheless, from August to October 1997, Nigerian forces
heavily engaged the rebels in combat, with the ECOWAS Monitoring
Group's (known as ECOMOG) vessels and planes barring all ships and
aircraft from Freetown.
Having deliberated for months about an appropriate response, on
October 8, 1997, the UN Security Council addressed the situation in Sierra
Leone in Resolution 1132. The Resolution requested Koromah to "relin-
quish power" and allow the "restoration of the democratically elected Gov-
ernment." 40  Although the Security Council found that the situation
represented a threat to international peace and security in the region, it de-
clined to authorize military intervention, and instead instituted an economic
sanctions regime (acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter). The sanctions
included an oil and arms embargo, and travel sanctions on members of the
AFRC and their families.41
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Howard W. French, Nigerians Fire on Rebels Who Seized Sierra Leone,
N.Y. TiMEs, June 3, 1997, at A10.
37 See Howard W. French, Nigeria, Set Back by Sierra Leone Rebels, Flies in
More Troops, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 1997, at A7.
38 ADEBAMO, supra note 10, at 87.
39 Rod MacJohnson, SLeone Junta Relieved as ECOWAS Rules Out Military
Ouster, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Aug. 30, 1997, available at http://global.factiva.
com/en/eSrch/sshl.asp.
40 S.C. Res. 1132, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l 132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
41 Id.
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Whether because of the economic sanctions, 42 or persistent calls for
negotiation, fifteen days after Resolution 1132, on October 23, 1997, the
AFRC signed an agreement in Conakry, Guinea, in which they agreed to
immediately disarm and respect a six-month timetable for Kabbah's restora-
tion. By December 1997, however, it was clear that the RUF and AFRC
were not disarming, and Koromah spoke of staying on until 2001 .4
On February 6, 1998, Nigeria accused Koromah's soldiers of at-
tacking its troops, which it insisted were there with ECOMOG authoriza-
tion.44 Although the UN Security Council called for a cease-fire, 45 a
Nigerian force of about 12,000, using heavy weaponry and in concert with
the Kamajors, moved in from Liberia, finally capturing Freetown after a
three-day battle on February 13.46 Nigeria captured some junta leaders, but
Koromah evaded capture and fled to Guinea.
Kabbah became the first democratically elected leader to be re-
stored to power by force on March 10, 1998. 47 On March 16, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1556, which partly lifted the economic sanc-
tions and welcomed Kabbah's return to power.48 On April 17, 1998, in
response to Kabbah's request for assistance, the Security Council author-
ized the deployment of up to ten military liaison and security advisory per-
sonnel to help Sierra Leone develop a disarmament plan.49
Additionally, at a May 1998 meeting of ECOWAS defense minis-
ters in Accra, Ghana, the Nigerian chief of staff, General Abdulsalam
Abubakar, called on other ECOWAS states to increase their contribution of
troops to Sierra Leone, but none did. Ninety percent of the 13,000
ECOMOG soldiers serving in Sierra Leone were Nigerian; Ghana and
Guinea contributed about 600 troops each, and Mali contributed about
500.50 The Security Council, for its part, adopted Resolution 1181 in Au-
42 See also David Cortright et al., Sierra Leone: The Failure of Regional and
International Sanctions, in THE SANCTIONs DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES
IN THE 1990S 167, 170 (David Courtright & George A. Lopez eds., 2000).
43 See The Secretary-General, Third Report on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 1 10,
U.N. Doc. S/1998/103 (Feb. 5, 1998).
44 ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 88.
45 Howard W. French, Nigerians Take Capital of Sierra Leone as Junta Flies,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at A3.
46 Id.; see also ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 88.
47 Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 28, at 330.
48 See S.C. Res. 1156, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1156 (Mar. 16, 1998) (terminating
the prohibitions on the sale and supply of petroleum to Sierra Leone).
49 See S.C. Res. 1162, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (Apr. 17, 1998).
50 ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 91.
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gust 1998, which established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL) with about 50 peacekeepers. 5
Considering the RUF's history, even with 13,000 soldiers defend-
ing Freetown, it was only a matter of time before the rebels would test the
peacekeepers' mettle. On January 6, 1999, the RUF launched "Operation
No Living Thing."52 Over a period of only a couple of months, RUF fight-
ers amputated the limbs of over 1,000 people.53 Many amputated hands
were deposited on the steps of the Presidential residence as a brutal re-
minder of Kabbah's former election slogan. As for the West African
peacekeeping force:
ECOMOG soldiers, caught off-guard by the assault, went
haywire and embarked on their own version of Operation
No Living Thing, executing suspected RUF on the Aber-
deen Bridge and dumping their bodies into the river below.
Roadside justice was the order of the day. Anyone re-
motely suspected of being involved with the RUF was tor-
tured, raped, and summarily executed by the Nigerian
soldiers, including an unknown number of perfectly inno-
cent civilians whose elbows were tied behind them before
they were shot at point-blank range. One retarded 9-year-
old-boy, whose plight was highlighted in the documentary
film Cry Freetown, was stripped naked, beaten, and tor-
tured by Nigerians who suspected him of being an RUF
sniper. It's hard to tell which is worse; that ECOMOG beat
and tortured children, or that the RUF had enlisted young
kids so extensively that ECOMOG was put into a position
where it had no choice but to suspect even the least suspi-
cious of being an RUF killer.54
While Nigeria/ECOMOG did rout the RUF from Freetown within days, the
death toll was nearly 6,000. 55
Particularly after the release of the CNN-aired documentary Cry
Freetown, Nigeria was heavily criticized for its operations in Sierra Leone.
Following the death of Sani Abacha and Nigeria's elections in May 1999,
President Olusegun Obasanjo asked ECOMOG's High Command to pre-
pare for the phased withdrawal of Nigerian troops. As Adebajo aptly de-
51 S.C. Res. 1181, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1181 (July 13, 1998).
52 Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 28, at 331.
53 Id. at 332.
54 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 88-89.
55 Id. at 89.
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scribed the situation: "There was a realization in Abuja that Nigeria and its
logistically handicapped peacekeepers could not continue to do most of the
spending and dying in Sierra Leone while the international community sim-
ply sat on its hands." 56 The operation reportedly cost Nigeria $1 million per
day, although it was also reported that the former Abacha government used
Sierra Leonean expenses improperly.
Nigeria Backs Away, And the UN Picks Up The Reins
With Kabbah successfully restored to Freetown, and the Nigerians
posturing to leave, the government was forced to resume negotiations with
the RUE. A cease-fire agreement was signed on May 18, 1999, which gave
the government the opportunity to enter into peace negotiations with the
RUF-AFRC in the Togolese capital, Lom6. The Lom6 Accord took six
weeks to negotiate, and involved a number of international intermediaries:
the United States sent Jessie Jackson; the UN sent a Special Representative,
Francis Okelo; and several regional heads of state played crucial roles, in-
cluding Charles Taylor of Liberia and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. The
government and RUF-AFRC finalized the Lom6 agreement on July 7, 1999.
In addition to another general amnesty provision, the agreement
formally lifted the death sentence over Sankoh [related to
his arms trafficking in Nigeria], called for the RUF to be
transformed into a political party, provided for cabinet
posts for the RUF in a government of national unity, gave
Sankoh the vice presidency as well as the chairmanship of a
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources,
and called for the establishment of a Council of Elders and
Religious Leaders to mediate political disputes. The
AFRC's Johnny Paul Koromah was later appointed chair-
man of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to
monitor implementation of the agreement.5 7
To enforce the agreement, the UN was asked to contribute troops to a dis-
armament and elections-monitoring mission. ECOWAS, for its part, would
direct a joint implementation committee to oversee compliance with the
agreement, as well as the repatriation and resettlement of 500,000 Sierra
Leonean refugees from Guinea and Liberia.5 8
56 ADEBAJO, supra note 10, at 97.
57 Id. at 99.
58 Id. At the time of the Lomd agreement, there were one million internally dis-
placed Sierra Leoneans.
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A month after the Lom6 Accord, on August 19, 1999, Nigeria's
President Obasanjo notified the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, that
Nigeria would withdraw 2,000 of its peacekeepers from Sierra Leone every
month. Faced with an impending security vacuum, Annan recommended
that the Security Council establish a peace-enforcement mission in Sierra
Leone under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In a UN Security Council
Resolution of October 22, 1999, the Council agreed to terminate the for-
merly small UNOMSIL and establish a larger UN Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL) to take over ECOMOG's duties, under an Indian UN Force
Commander, General Vijay Jetley.59 Nigeria, which had wanted to head the
military wing of UNAMSIL, was instead given authority over the political
wing.60 The 6,000-strong UNAMSIL was established at a cost of $476 mil-
lion, and included contingents from Nigeria, India, Jordan, Kenya, Ban-
gladesh, Guinea, Ghana and Zambia.
As with every other public security force deployed in Sierra Leone,
UNAMSIL had its share of problems. There was confusion about the
force's mandate and rules of engagement, some units lacked proper training
and equipment, and the Nigerian head of the Mission's political wing did
not have a good relationship with the Mission's Indian military com-
mander.61 Despite the Security Council's decision to increase UNAMSIL's
force strength to 11,000 troops, the peacekeepers' lack of unity and organi-
zation made them a target for rebel attacks. By May 5, 2000, the RUF had
kidnapped and commandeered the arms and equipment of over 500 UN
peacekeepers (the majority were Zambians).62 Despite the hostage crisis,
the United States, Britain and France refused to support a UN rapid reaction
force to stabilize the situation. 63 As Nigeria withdrew its last remaining
ECOMOG forces, it looked as if UNAMSIL were destined to lose its grip
on security.
59 U.N. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct.
22, 1999).
60 The Secretary-General named Nigerian Oluyemi Adeniji as his Special Repre-
sentative in Sierra Leone.
61 ADEBAO, supra note 10, at 101. The Indians alleged that Adeniji was too cozy
with Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, and colluded with the rebels to profit from the
illicit diamond trade.
62 RUF believed to be holding "at least" 318 UN peacekeepers, BRrr. BROAD-
CASTING CORP., May 5, 2000.
63 Nigeria reports US, UK, France said to be refusing to send troops to Sierra
Leone, BRrr. BROADCASTING CORP., May 5, 2000. See also Norman Kempster &
Marjorie Miller, U.S. Rejects Call for Sierra Leone Deployment, L.A. TIMES, May
9, 2000, at A4.
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Britain Bolsters UNAMSIL on its Own Terms
As RUF forces once again menaced Freetown, on May 8, 2000,
upon President Kabbah's request, Britain sent in 700 troops from the 1st
Battalion, Parachute Regiment, to secure the airport. 64 Its mission, initially,
was to assist in the evacuation of EU and other nationals from the capital,
but within days it became clear that Britain would also stay to provide a
backbone from which UNAMSIL could regroup. The United States offered
only to provide logistical support, to help fly in more (Bangladeshi) UN
peacekeepers.
65
The British mission was widely seen as successful, as the RUF once
again retreated from the capital. The question then became how long the
British would stay, and on what terms. By the end of May, President Kab-
bah was publicly pleading to Prime Minister Tony Blair to maintain a pres-
ence in Sierra Leone.66 Despite rhetoric in Parliament warning of Britain
being "sucked in" to the conflict, the British stayed on, and began advocat-
ing a stronger UN presence, while nevertheless refusing to work within
UNAMSIL's command structure. No longer there to evacuate nationals,
Britain began a mission to "revamp in emergency while teaching by exam-
ple."' 6 7 Accordingly, Britain started training the government's army, the
SLA.
But no force new to Sierra Leone ever got away scot-free: On Au-
gust 25, 2000, an RUF faction, called the "West Side Boys," captured 11
British soldiers and one Sierra Leonean soldier east of Freetown. Five
soldiers were released in negotiations, but when talks stalled on September
9, a British rescue operation recovered only six. The last soldier, Lance
Bombardier Brad Tinnion, was killed in the rescue. 68 In the West Side
Boys' headquarters, the British found $38 million worth of rebel
diamonds.69
Although Britain stabilized the security situation in and around
Freetown, UNAMSIL was still left with the problem of securing the coun-
64 Sarah Schaefer, Parliament: Sierra Leone: Troops "Must Not Become Peace-
Keepers," THE INDEP., May 9, 2000, at 8.
65 Blaine Harden & Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Plans to Help Airlift U.N. Forces
Into Sierra Leone, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at Al.
66 Kim Sengupta, British Troops Must Stay to Avoid "Catastrophe," Warns Presi-
dent Kabbah, Tim INDEP., May 27, 2000, at 6.
67 DANIEL BERGNER, IN THE LAND OF MAGIC SOLDIERS: A STORY OF WHITE AND
BLACK IN WEST AFRICA 25 (2003).
68 Ed O'Loughlin, UK Troops Expand Role in Sierra Leone War, THE INDEP.,
Nov. 13, 2000, at 14. Tinnion was the first, and only, British fatality.
69 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 95.
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tryside, including the diamond mining areas. Moreover, the British arrival
did nothing to improve the situation between UNAMSIL's military and po-
litical chiefs. In September, a report Jetley wrote accusing the political arm
of UNAMSIL with RUF collusion in illicit diamond exports was leaked to
the press. The resulting tension led to the withdrawal of all 3,000 Indian
troops in October, 2000. Jordon took the opportunity to withdraw its two
battalions at the same time, with the complaint, shared by India, that no first
world country demonstrated a willingness to operate under UN command.70
Faced with the withdrawal of the UN's most professional troops, Prime
Minister Blair reportedly appealed to every major European government to
provide troops to UNAMSIL, but only Slovakia offered even logistical sup-
port. Other governments claimed that they were too heavily committed to
peacekeeping in Kosovo, Bosnia, Georgia or Ethiopia.
71
In May 2000, the government, UN, and the RUF met in Abuja,
Nigeria, and developed a plan to implement the demobilization and peace
promised at Lom6. 72 A year later, the parties met in Abuja again, and at this
meeting the RUF agreed to fully disarm.73 UNAMSIL remains in Sierra
Leone as of this writing, with a force strength of 11,000 peacekeepers.
74
POST-CONFLICT SIERRA LEONE: DUAL-TRACK HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
Sierra Leone's lengthy peace process moved on two tracks: the
first track was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by the
Lom6 agreement, and the second track was the later-developed Special
Court. The country recently completed its experience with the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which recorded testimony from about
6,000 Sierra Leoneans. 75 While some analysts expected problems with this
70 O'Loughlin, supra note 68.
71 Andy McSmith, Blair Troops Appeal Fails, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 11, 2000,
at 4.
72 Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolu-
tionary United Front, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1091 (Nov. 14,
2000), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire1100.html.
73 See The Secretary-General, Tenth Report of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2001/627 (June 25, 2001).
74 UN Troops "to stay" in S Leone, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORP., Mar. 25, 2004.
75 William Schabas, former Commissioner for the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission for Sierra Leone, Address at the 2004 American Society of International
Law Annual Meeting (April 2, 2004).
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dual-track system, it appears that the TRC successfully operated as a com-
pliment to the Special Court.76
The Special Court's Establishment
As noted in the later history of the Sierra Leonean war, despite the
agreement at Lom6, the RUF continued hostilities against the government.
Therefore, the need was recognized to curtail the blanket amnesty granted
to the RUF in the Lom6 agreement since this provision had rested on the
fulfillment of disarmament and cessation of hostilities. Moreover, at Lom6,
the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative included a handwritten
note stating that, "the United Nations has consistently maintained the posi-
tion that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such
as genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law. '77
In accordance with this position that customary international law
prohibits the granting of amnesty for grave breaches of international hu-
manitarian law, on June 12, 2000, Sierra Leone's President Kabbah re-
quested that the UN Secretary-General establish a part-international, part-
municipal court to address gross human rights violations committed during
the civil war. This letter gave rise to Security Council Resolution 1315, in
which the Council recognized the need to establish a court for Sierra Le-
one.78 On February 16, 2002, the UN and Sierra Leonean government en-
tered into an agreement for the Special Court's establishment. The Sierra
Leonean Parliament ratified the agreement in March 2002.79 Therefore, un-
like the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court is a sui generis treaty body estab-
lished through this joint agreement.
The Special Court's structure resembles that of other international
criminal tribunals in that it has a Trial Chamber, an Appeals Chamber, an
Office of the Prosecutor, and a Registry. The judges of the Special Court
are a mixture of appointees from Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary General
76 Id. See also Jennifer L. Poole, Post Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone, in POST-
CONFLICT JUSTICE 563, 591 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 2002) ("Sierra Leone is
fortunate to have these two concurrent accountability mechanisms.").
77 See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establish-
ment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 22, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4,
2000).
78 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
79 SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE OFFICE OF PRESS AND PUBLIC AF-
FAIRS, HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/handbook-
forjoumalists.html.
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(upon nominations by the states), members of ECOWAS, and the Common-
wealth of Nations. Under the terms of the agreement, Sierra Leone ap-
pointed three judges, two to the Appeals Chamber, and one to the Trial
Chamber.80 Each judge serves a three-year term and is eligible for
reappointment. 8'
The Special Court's Challenges
The Special Court's biggest obstacle is its limited total budget of
approximately $56.8 million - it is funded entirely from international dona-
tions.82 By contrast, the ICTR's budget for just the year 2003 was about
$87 million and the ICTY's budget for the same year was about $109 mil-
lion.8 3 Funding constraints act in tandem with the restrictions on the Spe-
cial Court's temporal jurisdiction (only crimes committed after the Conkary
Accord on November 30, 1996 can be brought) to limit the number of pros-
ecutions to around 30 people.
As of this writing, the Special Court has handed down 13 indict-
ments, although several high-profile leaders have eluded the Court's
grasp.84 For example, the RUF's leader, Foday Sankoh, died in the Court's
custody; another RUF leader, Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, died in Liberia in
early May 2003; the former AFRC leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, is rumored
to be dead, although his remains have not been recovered for identification.
80 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at art. 12(1),
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
Sierra Leone appointed British citizen Geoffrey Robertson and Sierra Leonean Ge-
laga King to the Appeals Chamber, and Rosolu John Bankole Thompson to the
Trial Chamber. Thompson was then elected Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber
on Dec. 2, 2002.
81 Id. at art. 13(3).
82 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, art. 6,
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html.
83 The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promises and Pitfalls of a "New Model,"
AFRICA BRMFING (International Crisis Group Report, Freetown/Brussels), Aug. 4,
2003, at 3 n.17.
84 Aside from Charles Taylor, the remaining indictees, all charged with crimes
against humanity, war crimes and other violations of international criminal law,
are: From the RUF, Foday Sankoh, Issa Sesay, Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, Morris
Kallon and Augustine Gbao; from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC) and its splinter group, the West Side Boys, Johnny Paul Koroma, Alex
Tamba Brima and Ibrahim "Bazzy" Kamara; from the Civil Defence Forces (CDF),
Chief Sam Hinga Norman, Moninina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa.
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Charles Taylor is currently in the custody of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.85 The Special Court "has asked the Netherlands to host the trial of
Mr. Taylor at the International Criminal Court.' 86
Finally, the Special Court has endured some criticism of its judges.
First, while many of the Court's judges are African, most Trial Chamber
panels include at least one non-African judge. This has led to accusations
of unfairness from those undergoing prosecution. 87 Second, the Appeals
Chamber, upon motion from three RUF defendants, ruled that Justice Geof-
frey Robertson may not sit on any case involving these defendants because
of anti-RUF statements he published in a book in 2000.88
CONCLUSIONS: THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL ENGAGEMENT
At first blush, the low-profile Special Court appears to be a minor
institution that will bring about the prosecution of a hodgepdge of serious
offenders in this massive tragedy. Since it is impossible to do individual
justice in this case, any deterrent effect created by the Special Court may be
offset by the large number of offenders who will escape punishment en-
tirely. However, a closer look at the nature of the conflict reveals that the
Special Court's role in capacity-building, and expanding the rule of law,
makes the institution more than just an apology for a long-neglected crisis.
The argument here is that the conflict in Sierra Leone was based, at
bottom, on a problem of international criminal law enforcement, and partic-
ularly, the government's inability to crack down on the illicit diamond
trade. One implication of this argument is that unlike other political con-
flicts, in Sierra Leone, the rebels could not be appeased or satisfied by the
kinds of things traditionally used to bring about a peace agreement. One
example is the often-used leverage of power-sharing in government. In Si-
erra Leone, history had demonstrated that it was largely a liability to be in
government. In a bush camp, a rebel leader can shoot anyone who chal-
lenges him, and this changes once one's rivals know one's address. Next,
the offering of amnesty at a peace table is only meaningful if the govern-
ment, or the community fostering the agreement, is willing and able to pros-
ecute in lieu of amnesty. In Sierra Leone, the threat of prosecution was
simply not credible to the heads of the factions actually in control of terri-
85 Dutch trial seeks ex-Liberia head, BRSr. BROADCASTING CORP., Apr. 24, 2006.
86 Id.
87 Sierra Leone War Crimes Suspect Protests White Judge, U.N. WIRE, Sept. 24,
2003, at http://www.pict-pcti.org/news-archive/03/O3Sep/Sierra_Leone_092403.
htm.
88 See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: TiH STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE (1999).
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tory and economic resources - at least not until the British intervened, and
rallied the international community for a genuinely effective UNAMSIL.
And finally, in Sierra Leone, no public affirmation of the revolutionary
movement's grievances would have had any effect because the movement
had no tangible grievances with the government. The government sitting
across the peace table never specifically oppressed the rebels as a group
prior to the war. Rather, from the rebels' perspective, what the government
really wanted was to regain control of diamond mining areas that it didn't
have the strength to capture on its own.
The difficulty of conflicts rooted in lax criminal law enforcement is
that they can only be fully addressed in the context of nation-building. For
this reason, the capacity-building efforts of the Special Court are not only
appropriate, but also long overdue. The presence of the Special Court in a
multi-million dollar courtroom facility in Freetown is likely to go a long
way in developing the recognition for the rule of law, at least in the capital.
Similarly, the Special Court continues to make efforts to inform a large
illiterate population about its work, which may increase citizens' under-
standing of criminal law enforcement generally. And lastly, although many
of the Special Court's staff persons are from other parts of the world, a
good number of attorneys, assistance and support staff members are native
Sierra Leoneans. This therefore leaves open the possibility that the juris-
prudence developed at the Special Court will "bleed into" the national legal
system.
It is proper to see the Special Court's benefits in this light, and give
the TRC some credit for bringing about actual closure to the war among the
population. Sierra Leone's TRC was well supported by civil society
groups, and incorporated a number of innovations into its work to en-
courage and protect, for example, women's rights in the reconciliation pro-
cess. Like the Special Court, the TRC had difficulty raising awareness
about its process in rural Sierra Leone, but initial reports suggest that the
process included a fair number of victims, as well as a smaller number of
perpetrators.
In conclusion, although Sierra Leone's hybrid court faces a number
of challenges, at least as an institution, it appears to be an appropriate and
necessary court for the criminal prosecution of the former conflict's leaders.
While its work may be incidental to a broader program of reconciliation
embodied in the TRC, its establishment demonstrates the international com-
munity's support for a stable Sierra Leonean government over the long-
term.
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